While considerable attention is being accorded to emotions in International Relations, this article seeks to integrate empathy into these interdisciplinary debates. It counters the dominant assumption that empathy tends to be largely benign and beneficial by conceptualising a typology of the costs of empathy. The dimensions of costs addressed are: epistemological, cognitive, emotional, material, and embodied. I argue that these costs are frequently tangible for those who make the ethical-political choice to engage in empathy in situations of conflict and political violence. Drawing on social psychology approaches, empathy is located within a framework of collective narratives, emotions, and social structures shaped by both micro-and macro-political processes. A model of empathy, which acknowledges social influences and the psychological mechanisms through which these influences may be mediated, contributes to a deeper understanding of how politics, psychology, and culture shape empathy and, crucially, helps understand the conditions which may affect the successes, limitations and failures of empathy in the (international) political sphere. The article offers empirical illustrations of the costs of empathy drawing on examples from Israel and Palestine.
Introduction
While considerable attention has been accorded to emotions in International Relations (IR) in recent debates, this article seeks to build on the debates on emotion by drawing attention to the questions at stake when we seek to theorise empathy in IR. The 18 th century saw the spread of empathy, or sympathy, in novels, plays, and public discourse (Reddy 2009: 306-9) . While it may be relatively easy to empathise with characters in a play at the theatre, it is far more challenging to empathise with members of an out-group under conditions of (protracted) conflict. Interpersonal dynamics play an important role at all levels of politics, including in the international sphere where the generation of empathy, trust, mistrust and other 'affective relations' (Pedwell 2014) between states rest, in part, on the complex cognitive and emotional relationships between diplomats, leaders and representatives (Holmes 2013; Yarhi-Milo 2013) . As such, the significance of empathy -its relations of power, costs, meanings and practices -should not be ignored as the navigation of beliefs, values, interests, and narratives remain as important to the construction of international politics as to national or community politics.
The difficulties faced by 'empathy entrepreneurs' 2 in particular call for an interrogation of what the costs of engaging in empathy might be in order to understand when actors may engage in empathy and the social and political structures and processes which constrain them. 3 A framework which acknowledges both social influences and the psychological mechanisms through which these influences may be mediated, contributes to a deeper understanding of how politics, psychology, and culture shape empathy and crucially, therefore, helps understand the conditions which may shape the successes, limitations and failures of empathy in the political sphere. While it may be unsurprising to many within IR that empathy is hard to find in conflicts, it is nonetheless necessary to understand the dynamics which block empathy if it is to be able to contribute to sustainable transformations of conflict through re-humanising the other and providing mutual insights to the other's needs and beliefs as it is often characterised in the conflict resolution literature (Deutsch 2006:65; Broome 1993; Rothman 1992; Galtung 2004; Staub 2011; Cameron, Weatherbed 2014) .
In order to elaborate on what the costs of empathy may be and to make the case for the relevance of this for international politics, I make two conceptual links in the argument that follows. First, I draw on the social psychology approach which informs Daniel Bar-Tal's socio-psychological infrastructure (2007, 2013) . As Herbert Kelman and other social psychologists working on conflict have noted, psychological processes constitute and mediate much of the behaviour located within the international sphere (2007: 62) . Bar-Tal's framework offers resources for exploring direct and indirect forms of power which enable and constrain the possibilities for empathy as well as highlighting the group dynamics which are key to generating the costs of empathy. Second, I engage with the sociologicallyinformed debate on micro-and macro-approaches to political processes (Hutchison and Bleiker 2014; Linklater 2014; Ross 2014; Kelman 2007) . I contend that the sociopsychological infrastructure creates a normative and emotional climate within and between groups and societies setting the background against which the transgression of these norms through empathic behaviour may exact costs at a micro level. While such costs may be 'felt'
primarily at the individual level, their connection to social norms, identities, beliefs, and political ideologies also ensures that they are entwined in wider structural and political relations.
The re-framing of IR's discrete 'levels of analysis' as a micro-macro approach to politics ensures that research on empathy is not relegated solely to the interpersonal sphere (and therefore marginalised within IR as a discipline which has traditionally focused on state phenomena) but is imbricated in the structural and agentic relations of both individuals and collectives at all levels. Indeed, as Andrew Ross has noted, 'contemporary microsociologists [suggest] that all structures at the macro-level involve micro-level patterns of action ' (2014:35) . The challenges faced at a micro level by individuals and communities as a result of the societal norms and structures understood through a socio-psychological framework contribute to an explanation of the failure of empathy to have a wider and more sustained impact at a macro level under conditions of protracted conflict.
The article will set out the relevant conceptual frames for empathy, the sociopsychological infrastructure, and the case for engaging with both micro-and macroprocesses. Having clarified the theoretical framework which facilitated the identification of these costs, the article will propose a typology consisting of five main types of cost: epistemological, cognitive, emotional, material, and embodied. Examples of these types of cost are developed in the final section in relation to the case of Israel and Palestine.
Coupled with existing scholarly research on inter-group conflict, the empirical data I collected through interviewing approximately twenty Israelis and Palestinians 4 working with non-violent approaches to the conflict at the grassroots and civil society level in Israel and the West Bank revealed a number of experiences illustrative of the micro-politics of empathy and the costs identified in the typology. 5 Focusing on the lived experiences of empathy at a micro-level allows these threads to be woven into a more complex picture of 4 Including Palestinian citizens of Israel and West Bank Palestinians. The small sample size poses obvious limits to more generalised claims, but the consistency of the experiences narrated, coupled with the evidence in the wider literature, draws attention to patterns which raise important questions around the conditions for empathy within conflict. 5 A focus on the costs of empathy experienced by those on all sides is not intended to flatten out the differences between subject positions, to gloss over the asymmetry of the conflict, nor to assume that all Israeli or Palestinians, irrespective of these differences, experience empathy or its absence in the same way.
micro-macro relations of conflict engendered by group dynamics and the sociopsychological infrastructure. 6 The typology offers a capacity to interrogate how and why empathy is costly in cases of conflict beyond the present empirical focus on Israel and Palestine. A focus on relevant political and psychological dynamics contributes to a stronger understanding of the challenges facing empathy and its entrepreneurs in international politics if empathy is indeed to work for sustainable peace and social justice.
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Israel and Palestine is an appropriate case to draw on to support and illustrate a theorisation of the costly dimension of empathy for several reasons. First, the considerable extant research on the narratives of conflict in the region, the emotional, psychological, political and cultural mechanisms through which they are perpetuated, and the consequences this has for social and political relations are all relevant for developing conceptual and analytical approaches for other protracted conflicts in international relations. Second, the extensive inter-disciplinary academic and policy focus on resolution and reconciliation processes that has developed around this conflict frequently recognises the need for empathy -either implicitly or explicitly -but focuses less on theorising its limits and contingencies. Third, the degree to which the conflict is interwoven with the structures, institutions, discourse and policies of international actors draws attention to the need to reconfigure our ways of thinking about levels of analysis in IR given the salience of emotions, empathy and narratives at the micro and macro level for the perpetuation, potential transformation, and analysis of the conflict.
Defining empathy: walking a few miles in the shoes of the other Four psychological states have been identified which are helpful for establishing a suite of capacities called empathy and for recognizing the complex relationship between cognition and emotion which characterises empathy (Batson and Ahmad 2009) . The cognitive/perceptual states identified are: 1) Imagine-self perspective (imagining how one would think and feel in another's situation), and 2) Imagine-other perspective (imagining how another person thinks or feels given his/her situation -also characterised as cognitive 6 See Kelman (1996 Kelman ( , 2010 for a discussion on the close relationship between micro and macro processes in international conflict resolution from a social psychology perspective. 7 It is worth noting that the costly nature of empathy does not necessarily make it bad. The psychological pain of empathizing with the enemy may be constructive and even desirable. Any developmental process is likely to be difficult, but the cognitive and emotional challenges posed by the empathic process raise the possibility of positive/transformative outcomes. Thanks to David Traven for comments on this.
perspective-taking). The affective/emotional states identified are: 3) Emotion matching (feeling as another person feels), and 4) Empathic concern (feeling for another person who is in need -this is also commonly characterized in the literature as sympathy) (Batson and Ahmad 2009: 144) . These categorisations of cognitive-emotional activities, which fall under the broad umbrella of empathy, also reflect the emergence of distinctions between empathy, compassion/sympathy, and emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is an automatic response to the emotions of others which is experienced at an early stage of human development before babies have learnt to differentiate between themselves and others (Frevert 2011: 150) . While sympathy, like compassion, implies a 'pro-social, cooperative and benevolent attitude towards the other person' (Frevert 2011: 178) , empathy does not inevitably require any positive regard for the other (White 1984: 9) .
Indeed, Martha Nussbaum has noted that a torturer may use empathy for 'hostile and sadistic ends ' (2001: 333) .
This broader set of empathic-related capacities can also be defined as the 'art of stepping imaginatively into the shoes of another person, understanding their feelings and perspectives, and using that understanding to guide your actions' (Krznaric 2014: x) . This type of definition serves more than one meaning of empathy. It embraces a broader, philosophical, definition of perspective-taking which may be morally neutral and which is essential to all forms of social interaction, whether cooperative or conflictual, as well as empathy in the normative sense which implies some form of positive identification with the feelings of others. It is the latter meaning with which we are currently concerned; while cognitive perspective-taking is largely unavoidable, it does not precipitate the same degree of normative interest in the well-being of others.
The case for focusing on the costs of empathy emerges from the normative narratives of empathy often found in the peacebuilding, development, psychological, and political literatures (Pedwell 2012 (Pedwell , 2013 Crawford 2002 Crawford , 2014 Marlier and Crawford 2013; Staub 2011; Monroe 2012; Kelman 1996 Kelman , 1999 Nussbaum 2002; Baron-Cohen 2011; Bar-Tal 2013; Halperin, Sharvit, and Gross, 2011; Morrell 2010 ) which tend to assume that exercising empathy, although far from easy, is largely beneficial in the long-term for the parties involved as it may lead to reconciliation, conflict resolution, deliberative democracy, or practices of global governance. This normative orientation to promoting the well-being of others is captured by Neta Crawford's argument that 'Increasing the capacity for empathy is likely one of, if not the most important, routes to peace and justice ' (2014: 544) . In parallel policy terms, President Barack Obama voiced much the same sentiment in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, when he said in relation to Israel and
Palestine that 'the deadlock will only be broken when each side learns to stand in the other's shoes; each side can see the world through the other's eyes ' (2011) .
This normative approach to empathy seeks to expand the boundaries of our moral concern (Krznaric 2014: xxi) , to extend compassion towards vulnerable others, to encourage pro-social behaviour, to contribute to social cohesion, reconciliation and 'humanising'
processes, and to develop ethical deliberative capacities (Morrell 2010) . This approach usually attributes universal recognition to other human beings as fellow humans (Appiah 2006; Nussbaum 2002; Linklater 2007; Staub 2011) and challenges tendencies to objectify others in order to exclude or act violently against them in some manner. Even Martha
Nussbaum, who assigns a neutral value to empathy, recognises that it involves a 'basic recognition of another world of experience, and to that extent it is not altogether neutral' (2001: 333) . In other words, the failure to recognise the humanity of others is a deeper kind of evil even than empathy used for hostile ends. As Ervin Staub summarises, '[k]nowing adversaries so as to accurately take their perspective, understanding their concerns and needs, and empathizing with them enables people to work on resolving conflict and overcoming hostility ' (2011: 328) . It is, he suggests, a key component to humanising others (2011) . Similarly, mediators Giandomenico Picco and Gabrielle Rifkind have declared that 'empathy -which is not appeasement -is an essential component of the art of peacemaking because entering into the mind of the enemy increases the possibility of resolving conflict ' (2014: 7) . Empathy is also often accorded a moral dimension, as it articulates a crucial element of an ethics of political community and questions the extent of our moral and ethical obligations to distant and unknown others (Slote 2007; Koehn 1998; Habermas and Dews, 1992: 269 area) was, for her, 'a political commitment…my penance'. She understood her role and capacity for identification with Palestinians as that of witness. Author interview, 2014. 9 While empathy always involves individual cognitive-emotional processes, I am using collective empathy to refer to shifts in collective narratives regarding the recognition, legitimization and re-humanisation of the other. 10 While Bar-Tal's framework is developed with situations of intractable conflict in mind, research on emotions and memory suggest that constellations of shared memories, emotions and beliefs are always operating within and between groups, societies, states, international regimes, organisations, movements and networks (Ross 2014: 35-7) . The more 'sacred' the belief or identity is to a particular society, the more mobilized the group is likely to be to protect it, the more emotional commitment is likely to circulate within the group and the greater the likelihood of shared negative emotions towards the out-group. Under such circumstances, empathising with the other group's equally sacred beliefs is likely to trigger retribution in some form and/or pressure to conform to the hegemonic belief. Entrenched collective emotional dispositions towards groups, individuals, or symbols are likely to inhibit empathy, as well as creating greater difficulties for empathy entrepreneurs, especially as they may be triggered through socialisation and memory rather than solely through direct experience. Such asymmetries of power and status shape which voices get heard and which narratives are accepted or marginalised. Operating not only at a discursive level, such asymmetries also impact on the constitution of political power at an institutional level.
The constitution of empathy, as with emotions, is not reducible to the biological or neuroscientific processes of the individual, as individuals are always embedded in social institutionalization of emotions is perhaps the key thread that ties the agential aspects of emotions to the structures and processes of world politics ' (2013: 122) . 12 Master narratives are intended to be indicative rather than deterministic or homogenising. They highlight the importance of such narratives and the work that they do but they are not intended to construct a binary dichotomy of subject positions.
contexts. These contexts shape whether empathy is likely to be expressed, how it may be expressed, and by and for whom (Demertzis 2013: 6) . Empathy requires that 'we connect the process in the micro-level to the process in the macro-level. So people see that it is not other people that are responsible but me and you and you and you that are creating this dynamic in the conflict' (Interview with Sonnenschein, 2014) . This recognition of focused responsibility embraces the complex micro-and macro-dynamics between the beliefs, behaviour, and values of the individual, the structures and discourses of societies, and the policies of governments; all aspects reflected in the socio-psychological infrastructure. The adoption of the distinction between micro and macro politics has increasingly shaped the emotions debates in IR as well as elsewhere. Nicolas Demertzis has noted in relation to the analysis of emotions that the micro level concerns the intrapersonal dimensions of emotive life, the meso level corresponds to social interaction in groups, institutions, everyday encounters and the emotional dynamic therein, whereas the macro level entails norms, rules, law, traditions and socio-economic structures which provide the 'path dependency' for emotional cultures and social emotions to be formed (2013: 8).
In other words, the multiple layers of emotional life, from the individual to the international, are interlinked. The preceding discussion of the socio-psychological infrastructure demonstrates the significance of the dominant emotional climate, norms and beliefs of society for the formation of a micro-politics of empathy. Making a parallel argument in relation to emotions, Demertzis notes that '[a]s they are distributed in time and space, norms function as an instance of the macro reality; internalized by the subjects qua beliefs and goals they are rendered an instance of microreality ' (2013: 8) .
Consequently, collective emotional orientations of societies affect not just the decision-making and interpretative processes of individuals but they also animate the policy process through the assessment of threats, the construction of security discourses, decisions on military spending, defense, foreign policy, and so on A Typology of the costs of empathy: theory and practice
In line with its oft-cited normative benefits, empathy is often presented as an inhibitor of aggressive behaviour and a contributing factor in preventing people from committing acts of violence against others (Baron-Cohen, 2011; Staub 2011: 327; Moses 1985) . As will be clear from the preceding discussion this claim should be mediated by recognising that membership of in-groups and out-groups (and their associated identities) is likely to shape any empathic process. In other words, empathy with fellow members of the in-group -and the consequent strengthening of collective identity -may serve to block or limit the empathy shown towards members of the out-group and contribute to dynamics of conflict.
Empathy is not, therefore, an emotion per se, but a process which can trigger a wide range of emotions. Empathy oriented towards fellow members of the in-group as a result of 'terrorist' actions against them has, for example, triggered negative emotions and justified harmful behaviours -torture, rendition, human rights abuses, targeted killings -towards those perceived to be in out-groups.
It is a widely recognised phenomenon of group dynamics that members of a group may police others within the group. Ron Aminzade and Doug McAdam capture this essential dynamic and it is worth quoting them at length:
all such groups -informal no less than formal -provide bedrock identity and other ontological benefits to their members. The fact that they do affords these groups some considerable leverage with which to shape the actions of those individuals who hope to retain the various solidary benefits that come with group membership. In other words, once the process of "social appropriation" has taken place and the group has committed itself to Extending this line of argument in another context, the socio-psychological infrastructure which shapes the dominant terrorism discourse has similarly been maintained by 'a large assortment of social institutions (the media, academia, security agencies, legal entities, political actors, and so on), an ever-growing set of material and discursive practices of security and control…and a vast array of cultural productions (films, novels, academic outputs, newspaper articles, official reports, laws, regulations, jokes, Web sites, comics, art, theater, and so on)' (Jackson 2015: 2) . Where the socio-psychological infrastructure supporting a conflict narrative has been successfully institutionalised, the cost of empathy with members of the out-group is likely to be higher (and the rewards for in-group loyalty correspondingly significant). Empathy is costly, therefore, because power operates through social identities and group dynamics in such a way that it is psychologically and politically difficult for people to empathize with outsiders.
The more effective the socio-psychological infrastructure is, the more challenging it is for individuals who seek to identify with and voice alternative narratives. As Jackson highlights in his discussion of terrorism mythography, when faced with '"the dilemma that the serious novelist shares with the ethnographer -the need to empathize with one's subject in order to be true to their tale", the terrorism novelist is bound to conform to the dictates of the [contemporary cultural and political] taboo and avoid at all costs "talking to 
Types of Cost Forms of expression (examples) Epistemological
Positions of hierarchy Voices of authority/'expert' knowledge Objectivity Limits of knowledge 13 Four key themes are identified by Hammack (2011) in the master narrative of Jewish-Israeli identity. These are: 1) historical persecution and victimization of the Jews; 2) existential insecurity; 3) the exceptionalism of Jewish Israelis; and, 4) the delegitimization of the Palestinians which, at the extreme end of the spectrum, is characterised by a denial of an indigenous Palestinian identity (2011: 117. Similarly, Hammack identifies four central themes in the master narrative of Palestinian identity: 1) the experience of loss and land dispossession; 2) resistance as a consequence of the perceived injustice of this loss; 3) existential insecurity in terms of identity and everyday life in Palestine; and, 4) the delegitimization of Israeli identity (2011: 160-1). 14 Neither the types nor the examples provided of these costs are claimed to be exhaustive. Feminist theorists have theorised empathy as an intersubjective epistemology, which moves away from the notion of the autonomous or universal subject (Hemmings 2011; Collins 2000; Sylvester 1994) . It is, they suggest, one way of mitigating the forms of representational violence often done through an absence of empathy for the knowledge and experience of the other subject (Hemmings 2011: 201) . While not unproblematic, feminist thought highlights an important epistemological point: engaging in empathy may represent a cost in relation to positions and voices of authority, 'expert knowledge', and established intellectual and institutional hierarchies. Empathy requires of its participantswhatever their professional status, class, race, or gender -an openness and vulnerability to the ontological and epistemological knowledge of the 'other'. Such openness may disrupt dominant modes of thinking and feeling as it encounters marginalised identities, forms of knowledge, and subaltern narratives.
While this is by no means necessarily a cost -indeed many would argue it is an asset! -it nonetheless runs counter to an objective or positivist epistemology that has long dominated international relations and political science. Questioning the authority of the speaking or writing academic subject, Jackson argues that 'the professional academic voice is strictly limited in its capacity to convey some realities, some knowledge, some voices' I argued above that cognition and emotion should be treated as mutually constitutive of empathic processes; while an analytical distinction is helpful for the purposes of the typology, empirically separating these intertwined processes is rarely possible.
Alienation from one's own collective narrative is likely, for example, to both evoke and be constituted by emotions of sadness, anger, guilt, shame, and loneliness. Similarly, the deconstruction and reconstruction of individual or collective beliefs and identities is likely to be accompanied by a range of emotions. This process of alienation emerges from a dissonance between the socially expected emotions, beliefs or identity -feeling ruleswhich are institutionalised in the socio-psychological infrastructure, and the actually experienced emotions, beliefs, shifts in values, and so on. Drawing on experiences from
Israel and Palestine, the illustrations of a micro-politics of empathy that follow do not adhere strictly to a single type of cost but instead demonstrate these interwoven types as consequences of in-group policing dynamics enabled through the framework of the sociopsychological infrastructure.
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As the stronger party in an asymmetrical conflict, for some Israelis the most significant cost of engaging in empathy is often a sense of isolation or alienation from the dominant cultural and political Israeli master narrative and the consequent forms of identity disruption or cognitive dissonance which this causes. 16 The choice to become involved in transformative dialogue work is not a trivial one and may invoke a social, emotional, and A key cost of engaging in empathy with the Israeli other for Palestinians includes accusations of normalization which is one of most powerful narratives within the contemporary Palestinian political climate and which, at times, imposes a form of 'identity 15 Recognising the role played by in-group dynamics is not intended to deny the plurality of internal group dynamics, narratives, and beliefs in Israeli or Palestinian society but rather to highlight the psychological function of groups. 16 Jackson also recognises the dissonance caused by empathy through fiction: 'I wanted the affective qualities of the narrative to challenge the reader to re-evaluate and rethink their attitudes and beliefs about the motives of a terrorist and the nature of terrorism, in large part by humanizing the "terrorist" and generating a kind of dissonance -causing empathy with his life story, grievances, and aims (if not his methods)' (2015: 14, emphasis added). 17 There is a risk that if over-generalised this assumption may veil the recognition of extant alternative minority narratives within the Israeli public sphere. In so doing it would risk representing a dialogue around the 'costs' of empathy in terms which grant too much significance to the structures of the state and the sociopsychological infrastructure and insufficient importance to agency and counter-narratives, articulated through the myriad acts of resistance or transformation which are present within Israeli and Palestinian societies. 18 Other Palestinian and Israeli NGO leaders interviewed also reported similar issues (2014). Here it is not so much the listener's appreciation of or ability to connect with the embodied experience of the other (a core element of psychotherapy and Rogerian counseling) that is at stake but rather the meaning attributed to these embodied experiences by those living them. Clare Hemmings has referred to ways in which the 'breakdown of empathy produces a crisis mediated instead by prioritizing "bodily knowledge " (2011:197) . While empathy triggers forms of bodily knowledge, this is not limited to the failures or the breakdown of empathy. Indeed, I would suggest that forms of bodily knowledge may be an inherent dimension to all forms of empathy. This remains an area for further research, yet it is likely that all forms of empathy will write itself on the body in both physiological and psychological terms.
Conclusions
Whilst exposure to contested and disruptive narratives of the other may serve to trigger a re-examination of the language and terminology used by all parties to conflict, limit moral exclusion and elicit greater moral concern through the reconstruction of one's social identity, empathy -to 'walk a few miles in the shoes of the other' -is a demanding psychological and embodied experience which has the potential to trigger the disruption of one's identity in multiple ways. Drawing on a range of empirical examples from Israel and Palestine, I have sought to demonstrate how the socio-psychological infrastructure of societies in conflict creates significant costs to engaging in empathy. Group dynamics and social identities function in ways that make it both politically and psychologically difficult for individuals or groups to empathise with outsiders and, in particular, those portrayed historically and discursively as 'enemies'. The stronger the socio-psychological infrastructure is the higher the costs may be for empathy entrepreneurs.
More broadly in international politics, the macro-level socio-psychological infrastructure sets the background against which empathic behaviour may exact costs at a micro level. The perpetuation of the collective emotional orientation, ethos of conflict, and collective memories at a micro-level through effective in-group policing in turn feeds the wider reinforcement and iteration of macro-discourses around conflict and security. We can trace the relationship between the costs experienced at the micro-level by individuals to the continuation of broader policies, narratives, and beliefs which reinforce and perpetuate the conflict. The development of the typology highlights not only the types of costs exacted from empathy entrepreneurs but raises broader questions around the production and maintenance of conflict in international politics through the acceptance or contestation of selected narratives of conflict by political elites. Following the events of 9/11, former U.S.
secretary of defense Robert McNamara and James Blight argued for
The Empathy Imperative. The West, led by the United States, must seek by all possible means to increase its understanding of the history, culture, religion, motives, and attitudes of those who have declared themselves to be its adversaries. This effort should begin by developing empathy toward the Islamic fundamentalists, specifically those groups allied with, or sympathetic to, the international terrorist network known as al-Qaeda. Empathy does not imply sympathy or agreement; it does imply curiosity, leading to deeper understanding of an adversary's mindset, as a prerequisite to resolving differences and eliminating threats to peace and security (McNamara and Blight 2003: 234) .
The epistemological costs of empathy are of particular significance for policy-makers and political leaders as the forms and limits of knowledge they bring attention to pose a challenge to the hierarchies of political elites, to understandings of national interests and identity, to established relations of power and (in)equality, and to a reluctance to reveal vulnerability or uncertainty within domestic or international politics. As Maria Mälksoo writes, each state 'wishes to secure its being as a certain sort of being; to guarantee its cohesiveness in order to reduce the fundamental unpredictability of the surrounding environment and its own vulnerability vis-à-vis other political actors ' (2015: 4) . The ontological security of states to which Mälksoo is referring is problematised by the epistemological costs of empathy. Empathy unravels our established notions of security through understanding the histories, narratives, beliefs, and emotions of others. Empathy exposes a need to reconfigure self-other relations more reflexively in international relations;
it requires policy-makers to break habitual patterns of othering, to make space to reflect on the consequences of our actions and beliefs on others as well as the potential lead to 'higher cognitive processing and requires setting goals [including yearning for relief from negative conditions]; planning how to achieve them; use of imagery, creativity, cognitive flexibility, mental exploration of novel situations, and even risk taking ' (2008: 235) .
Echoing a similar set of cognitive skills to empathy, hope as an emotion provides a counterweight to the costs through the creative and committed activities of organisations and individuals such as those mentioned above which can contribute to (an admittedly marginalised) collective emotional orientation. That empathy may be costly does not prevent agents -at grassroots or elite levels -identifying with counter-narratives that look for the transformation of conflict. That this work often tugs against the tides of public opinion -and the socio-psychological infrastructure -is equally evident. As Ted Hopf notes, any 'efforts to change have first to overcome the power of habitual perceptions, emotions and practices ' (2010: 540) . Perhaps against the odds, empathy entrepreneurs -as agents of social and political change -develop modes of resistance to the individual and collective biases perpetuated by the socio-psychological infrastructure.
